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LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW

Kenneth M. Murchison*
The 1981-82 term produced a fairly typical assortment of decisions
in litigation involving local governments. As usual, the state decisions
covered a variety of areas including state-local relations,' the scope
of the police power,2 land use regulations,' property assessments for

Copyright 1982, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. E.g., ACORN v. City of New Orleans, 407 So. 2d 1225 (La. 1981); State v. Foy,
401 So. 2d 948 (La. 1981); State v. Rollins Envtl. Serv. of La., Inc., 398 So. 2d 1122
(La. 1981). See notes 52-72 infra, and accompanying text. See also Bodet v. Broussard,
407 So. 2d 810 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981), writ denied, 410 So. 2d 1132 (La. 1982) (adoption of State Code of Governmental Ethics does not preclude parish adoption and enforcement of ethics code applicable to parish employees); New Orleans Firefighters
Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 406 So. 2d 752 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981) (New Orleans
Civil Service Commission must include supplemental pay paid by the state when computing the overtime pay of the city's firefighters); Corcoran v. Parish of Jefferson,
405 So. 2d 667 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981) (state's Administrative Procedure Act requires
parish council to offer participants in adjudicatory hearings the opportunity to crossexamine witnesses).
2. See, e.g., Brousseau's, Inc. v. City of Baton Rouge, 400 So. 2d 1188 (La. 1981)
(city can deny a liquor permit on the basis of evidence showing a detrimental impact
on public health, safety, and morals, but the evidence before the city council with
respect to plaintiffs application was insufficient to justify denial); Gilbert v. Catahoula
Parish Police Jury, 407 So. 2d 1228 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981) (parish ordinance declaring
one-half of the property adjoining a gravel road to be an "open range" amounts to
an unreasonable exercise of the police power).
3. See, e.g., Furr v. Mayor of Baker, 408 So. 2d 248 (La. 1981) (city council's determination that a recording studio was not an establishment for retail sales was not
unreasonable); Christopher Estates, Inc. v. Parish of East Baton Rouge, 413 So. 2d
1336 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982) (local planning commission acted arbitrarily, capriciously,
and unreasonably in refusing to approve a subdivision plat that reduced the street
frontages of lots from 80 feet to 60 feet); Shenandoah Park Civic Ass'n v. Elizey, 409
So; 2d 354 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981) (planning commission must notify adjacent landowners
by certified mail of public hearings on whether to approve an amendment to a subdivision plat); City of West Monroe v. Ouachita Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc., 402
So. 2d 259 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981) (group home for the mentally retarded was a onefamily dwelling as that term was used in city zoning ordinance).
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public improvements,4 public contracts,5 tort liability,' public meetings, 7
4. Dorsey v. Iberia Parish Police Jury, 411 So. 2d 1249 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982)
(landowners are not entitled to a refund of a portion of their assessments when governmental entity decides not to implement design changes that landowners believe will
lower the cost of the public work); Cronan v. City of Kenner, 410 So. 2d 790 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1981) (landowners are not entitled to a judicial determination of whether local
governments can levy assessments that exceed cost of public works until an evidentiary hearing establishes that their assessments included such excess charges).
5. See, e.g., Donahue v. Board of Levee Comm'rs, 413 So. 2d 488 (La. 1982) (once
a local government has acquiesced in a judgment ordering it to award a contract to
the lowest responsible bidder, it cannot later decide to reject all bids and readvertise
the project); State v. City of Pineville, 403 So. 2d 49 (La. 1981) (Department of Highways
can recover money advanced to city on an unjust enrichment theory even though the
city's written agreement to repay the funds was unenforceable); Budd Constr. Co. v.
City of Alexandria, 401 So. 2d 1070 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981) (district court properly
enjoined city from awarding contract when city failed to follow its own procedures
in resolving a dispute as to which bidder had submitted the lowest bid).
6. E.g., Jenkins v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office, 402 So. 2d 669 (La. 1981);
Alexander v. Rapides Parish Police Jury, 415 So. 2d 607 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982); Robertson v. Parish of East Baton Rouge, 415 So. 2d 365 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982); McCoy
v. Franklin Parish Police Jury, 414 So. 2d 1369 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982); McLeod v.
Parish of East Baton Rouge, 414 So. 2d 1341 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982); Greenhouse
v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 413 So. 2d 352 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982); Swain v.
Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 413 So. 2d 233 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982); McNeal
v. Division of State Police, 412 So. 2d 1123 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 414 So.
2d 1252 (La. 1982); Carpenter v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 411 So. 2d 1206 (La.
App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 415 So. 2d 951 (La. 1982); Bacile v. Parish of Jefferson,
411 So. 2d 1088 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 415 So. 2d 950 (La. 1982); Goodlow
v. City of Alexandria, 407 So. 2d 1305 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981); Tappel v. Vidros, 407
So. 2d 789 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981); Orazio v. Durel, 407 So. 2d 75 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1981); De Laureal Eng'rs, Inc. v. St. Charles Parish Police Jury, 406 So. 2d 770 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1981), writ denied, 410 So. 2d 758 (La. 1982); Sullivan v. Quick, 406 So.
2d 284 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981); Curry v. Iberville Parish Sheriff's Office, 405 So. 2d
1387 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981), writ denied, 410 So. 2d 1130, 410 So. 2d 1135 (La. 1982);
Penalber v. Blount, 405 So. 2d 1378 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 407 So. 2d 1189
(La. 1981); Hall v. City of New Orleans, 400 So. 2d 265 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981); Martinez v. Reynolds, 398 So. 2d 156 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981). See notes 73-145 infra, and
accompanying text. See also Pratt v. State, 408 So. 2d 336 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982)
(police jury is entitled to protection of statutes limiting liability of owners of property
used for recreational purposes even though fees were charged for use of the recreational facilities); Jolivette v. City of Lafayette, 408 So. 2d 309 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981)
(city is not liable for damages diver suffered as a result of collision with swimmer
at public pool unless a city employee was guilty of negligence that was a cause in
fact of the accident); Tompkins v. Kenner Police Dep't, 402 So. 2d 276 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1981) (city is liable for investigating officer's failure to summon medical assistance
to person injured in an automobile accident).
7. Brown v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 405 So. 2d 1148 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1981) (school board violated Open Meetings Law when it used a selection procedure to reduce the number of applicants for superintendent's position while the board
was sitting in executive session); Kennedy v. Powell, 401 So. 2d 453 (La. App. 2d Cir.),
writ denied, 406 So. 2d 607 (La. 1981) (provision of Open Meetings Law requiring that
suits to void actions taken in violation of the law be filed within 60 days establishes
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and public employment.8 In addition, the United States Supreme Court
rendered important decisions concerning antitrust immunity,9 the need
for specificity in local business regulations,"0 and the scope of first
amendment freedoms." This article surveys the Supreme Court decisions on antitrust immunity and the need for specificity in business
regulations as well as selected state decisions in the areas of statelocal relations and the tort liability of local governments.
FEDERAL-LOCAL RELATIONS

The Supreme Court's opinions during the 1981-82 term provided
conflicting signals to local governments. On the one hand, the Court
emphatically reasserted that the "state action" doctrine did not inevitably shield local governments from antitrust liability under the
Sherman Antitrust Act.' 2 At the same time, the Court, by upholding
two municipal ordinances against vagueness challenges, indicated its

a rule of peremption that is not suspended by a plaintiffs lack of knowledge that
the action has been taken).
8. Mixon v. New Orleans Police Dep't, 407 So. 2d 793 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981)
(Civil Service Commission's rule that denied right of appeal to persons alleging age
discrimination defeated the legislative purpose of the civil service law and violated
the equal protection guarantees of the state and federal constitutions); Reboul v. New
Orleans Police Dep't, 407 So. 2d 509 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981) (court of appeal has discretion as to whether to grant city a suspensive appeal of Civil Service Commission's decision ordering reinstatement of police officer); Jackson v. St. Landry Parish School
System, 407 So. 2d 51 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981) (plaintiff acquired status as permanent
teacher under Teacher Tenure Law when school board failed to notify her of its intention not to rehire until after passage of three years from the date of her initial appointment); Linton v. Bossier City Mun. Fire & Police Civil Serv. Bd., 402 So. 2d 716
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1981) (three members of the board must concur before the board
can render a decision that is subject to judicial review).
9. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982). See
notes 12-33 infra, and accompanying text.
10. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 1186
(1982); City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982). See notes 34-51
infra, and accompanying text. Cf. State v. Farris, 412 So. 2d 1039 (La. 1982) (ordinance
prohibiting a person from hunting or fishing on "any unenclosed land or waters" is
unconstitutionally vague because it did not define the term "unenclosed land or waters"
and the term does not have a generally accepted meaning such that a person of ordinary intelligence would know what conduct was prohibited).
11. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981) (municipal
ordinance that placed a $250 limit on contributions to committees formed to support
or oppose local referenda imposed an unconstitutional restriction on first amendment
rights of association and expression). See also Godwin v. East Baton Rouge Parish
School Bd., 408 So. 2d 1214 (La. 1981), appeal dismissed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3252 (U.S. Oct.
4, 1982) (rule prohibiting persons from bringing hand-held signs into board meeting
is constitutional as a reasonable restriction on the time, place, and manner of exercising first amendment rights).
12. 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C. SS 1-7 (1976)).
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willingness to grant local governments considerable leeway in
regulating business establishments within their borders.
Antitrust Immunity
In its 1943 decision in Parkerv. Brown, 3 the Supreme Court held
that federal antitrust laws did not preclude a state from imposing
anticompetitive restraints on private persons when the state was
acting "as sovereign" and was imposing the restraints "as an act of
government."" Thirty-five years later, the Court refused to grant local
governments a similar immunity. In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co.," the Court ruled that the Parker doctrine did not
shield a municipality from liability for violating the antitrust laws in
its operation of an electric utility system.' 6 According to the Court's
opinion in City of Lafayette, Parker precluded municipal liability only
when the municipality engaged in the challenged conduct "pursuant
to state policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly
public service." 7
This year's decision in Community Communications Co. v. City of
Boulder 8 reaffirmed and expanded the City of Lafayette opinion by
13. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
14. Id. at 352. Parker involved a state "marketing program" under which regulated
raisin growers in California could dispose of their crops. Although the statutory scheme
upheld in Parker conflicted with the open-competition policy of the federal antitrust
laws, the approach the state had chosen was similar to the one employed in federal
New Deal statutes regulating other crops. See id. at 367-68.
15. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
16. State statutes specifically authorized the city to provide electric utility service within or without its borders. See LA. R.S. 33:1326, 33:4162-4163 (1950). For a brief
description of the Louisiana statutes involved in City of Lafayette, see Murchison, The
Work of the LouisianaAppellate Courtsfor the 1976-1977 Term-Local Government Law,
38 LA. L. REV. 462, 463-64 (1978).
17. 435 U.S. at 413.
18. 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982). For a discussion of the impact of Community Communications on antitrust law, see Conley, Developments in the Law, 1981-1982-Antitrust, 43
LA. L. REV. 283 (1982).
Justice Stevens added a brief concurring opinion emphasizing that the Court merely
had denied local governments immunity from the antitrust laws and had not established
the standards of liability that would apply in antitrust suits against governmental
defendants. 102 S. Ct. at 844-45.
Justice Rehnquist dissented in an opinion in which the Chief Justice and Justice
O'Connor joined. He argued that the Court had misconstrued the issue in Community
Communications by defining the issue as a question of whether the state action doctrine exempted local governments from the antitrust laws. The exemption concept
is appropriate, he argued, only when one is concerned with multiple enactments of
a single sovereign. When the overlap involves a federal statute and state laws or local
ordinances, rather than several federal statutes, the problem is one of preemption
rather than exemption; that is, the question is whether "the federal government has
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holding that Parker's state action doctrine did not immunize a "home
rule" municipality19 from antitrust liability for adopting an ordinance
that imposed a moratorium on the expansion of cable television service within its borders. According to Justice Brennan's majority opinion, the state action doctrine did not exempt the cable ordinance, from
antitrust scrutiny because neither of the tests recognized by prior
decisions were satisfied. The local ordinance did not "constitut[e] the
action of the [s]tate . . . itself in its sovereign capacity," nor did it
amount to local action in "furtherance or implementation of clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy."'
The city initially argued that its home rule status made the adoption of the cable ordinance "state" action within the meaning of Parker.
The city based this argument on the home rule amendment to the
Colorado Constitution,21 which vested the city with "every power
theretofore possessed by the [state] legislature . . . in local and
municipal affairs."22 According to the city, this constitutional grant
of authority made its ordinance "state action" because the adoption
of the ordinance amounted to "an 'act of government' performed by
the city acting as the state in local matters."23 The Supreme Court,
however, rejected this claim as inconsistent with the federalism principle on which the state action doctrine was based. The Court declared

occupied a particular field exclusively, so as to foreclose any state regulation." Id.
at 846. Justice Rehnquist regarded the rephrasing of the issue as decisive in Community Communications because "[t]he presumptions utilized in exemption analysis are
quite distinct from those applied in the preemption context." Id. In particular, he emphasized the presumption against preemption "absent the clear and manifest intention of Congress that the federal act should supersede the police powers of the state."
Id. See generally Handler, Antitrust-1978, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1378-83 (1978).
Justice Rehnquist termed it "quite clear" that the "state action" doctrine concerned
preemption because the issues raised in litigation about the doctrine "inevitably
involve state and local regulation which, it is contended, are in conflict with the Sherman Act." 102 S. Ct. at 846. Moreover, he could see no reason to use a different rule
of preemption for municipal ordinances than the one that the Court used for assessing
state statutes. Thus, he would uphold a municipal ordinance "if it is enacted pursuant
to an affirmative policy on the part of the city to restrain competition and if the city
actively supervises and implements this policy." Id. at 850 (footnote omitted).
19. See generally 0. REYNOLDS, HANDBOOK OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 95-103 (1982);
Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV.
269 (1968). For a brief description of the Louisiana provisions on home rule, see Murchison, Developments in the Law, 1980-1981-Local Government Law, 42 LA. L. REV. 564,
573-75 (1982).
20. 102 S. Ct. at 841.
21. COLO. CONST. art. XX, S 6, quoted in 102 S. Ct. at 836.
22. 102 S. Ct. at 841 (quoting Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Byrne, 618 P.2d
1374, 1381 (Colo. 1980); Four-County Metro. Capital Improvement Dist. v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 149 Colo. 284, 294, 369 P.2d 67, 72 (1962)).
23. 102 S. Ct. at 841 (emphasis in original).
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that American federalism is a "duel system of government" with "no
place for sovereign cities." As a result, the state action doctrine was
properly limited to actions of states, with local governments partaking
of the Parkerexemption "only to the extent that they acted pursuant
to a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy."24
The Court also rejected the city's argument that the home rule
amendment's "guarantee of local autonomy" satisfied the requirement
for a "clear articulation and affirmative expression" of state policy.
In the majority's view, this contention failed because the state's relationship to the city's ordinance was "one of mere neutrality," and such
an attitude of neutrality could never amount to affirmative endorsement of the local action. To hold otherwise would permit courts to
find that conflicting local approaches were all enacted pursuant to the
same clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy and
would thereby "wholly eviscerate the concepts of 'clear articulation
and affirmative expression.' "25
From the perspective of local government law, the most obvious
deficiency of the Community Communications opinion is its inaccurate
description of the position in the federal system occupied by local
governments with home rule charters. "Home rule" creates neither
a third level of sovereignty within the United States nor a nation
of city-states. To the contrary, it represents one manner in which
states may choose to exercise the measure of sovereignty that they
possess under the federal system. Instead of requiring the state
legislature to legislate as to "local matters," the state (normally
through the state constitution) may vest whatever legislative power
it has in a particular local governmental entity.
In light of the state choice involved in granting "home rule," a
local government exercising home rule powers should satisfy both tests
that Justice Brennan used to define the parameters of the state action
doctrine. First, the local action is the action of the state. The power
that the local government is exercising is the power of the state, and
the entity exercising the power is the entity that the state has
designated to exercise that power. Second, the local action also
furthers a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state
policy," the policy that local governments should make the substantive decisions about matters of local concern. In essence, the majority has decided that the "state policy" exemption applies only to

24. Id. at 842.
25. Id. at 843.
26. American courts uniformly have rejected the idea that local governments have
an inherent right to control their local affairs. See generally 0. REYNOLDS, supra note
19, at 66-74.
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substantive policies chosen by the state legislature. The state's right
to enforce a procedural policy that vests the decision making authority at the local level is left unprotected.
Far more difficult than criticizing the conceptual deficiencies of
the Community Communications opinion is predicting the impact the
decision will have. If the Court applies the substantive rules 7 and
treble damage remedies"8 normally used in antitrust cases, the dissent's dire predictions about hamstringing local governments2 9 seem
justified. Those dire predictions, however, may be a bit premature.
A footnote in the majority opinion indicates," and Justice Stevens'
concurring opinion emphasizes, 3' that Community Communications
merely denies the local government an exemption from the antitrust
laws and the decision does not attempt to articulate the substantive
standards of liability that will apply in suits against local governments.
One could, for example, greatly restrict the potential for liability by
refusing to apply the "per se" rules in cases against governmental
defendants and by defining the rule of reason as incorporating the
traditional reasonableness test used to evaluate the exercise of the
police power by local governments.32
Several years are virtually certain to elapse before it becomes
clear what direction the Court will choose to follow in establishing
standards of liability for antitrust suits against governmental defendants. One unfortunate by-product of this delay will be the strengthening of the hand of developers and other entrepreneurs who are
resisting local regulatory authority. Until the Court clarifies its
approach on the antitrust liability issue, prudent local governments
probably will compromise such suits to avoid confrontations that raise
the spectre of treble damage awards. To minimize this threat to local

27. For example, the Court has ruled that private parties cannot rely on noncompetitive factors, such as the promotion of safety, to justify the restriction of competition. See National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
28. Clayton Act, S 4, 15 U.S.C. S 15 (1980).
29. 102 S. Ct. at 848-51 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For a recent decision of the
Tenth Circuit holding that a state statute declaring the acquisition and operation of
airport facilities to be "public governmental functions" operated to immunize local governments from antitrust liability, see Pueblo Aircraft Serv. v. City of Pueblo, 679 F.2d 805
(10th Cir. 1982).
30. 102 S. Ct. at 843 n.20.
31. 102 S. Ct. at 844-45.
32. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Catahoula Parish Police Jury, 407 So. 2d 1228, 1231 (La.
1981); City of Shreveport v. Curry, 357 So. 2d 1078, 1081 (La. 1978); Hi-Lo Oil Co.
v. City of Crowley, 274 So. 2d 757, 762 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 277 So. 2d
673 (La. 1973); cf. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 513-21 (1977) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (arguing that the reasonableness test is required by the federal guarantee
of due process).
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power, the Court needs to begin sketching the basic parameters of
local liability as soon as cases raising the issues arise.
Whatever liability rules eventually emerge, Community Communications makes it clear that attorneys who advise local governments must understand the rudiments of antitrust liability. Although
antitrust experts surely will assume leadership in shaping the rules
to control governmental liability, generalists who represent local
governments will have to advise their clients about a host of problems that now have antitrust overtones.3 To discharge their duties
competently, these attorneys will have to acquire at least a basic
understanding of the intricate world of antitrust law.
Need for Precision in Local Regulations
In two other decisions, the Court adopted a far more deferential
attitude to local decision makers than that displayed in the antitrust
decision by rejecting vagueness challenges to local regulations of
business. In City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc.," the Court
upheld a municipal licensing ordinance requiring the chief of police
to consider whether an applicant had any "connections with criminal
elements." In addition, the Court, in Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 5 rejected a challenge to an ordinance
establishing a licensing requirement for businesses that sold items
"designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs."
The ordinance36 challenged in City of Mesquite required the police
chief to review all applications "for coin-operated amusement establishment[s]" and to recommend to the city manager whether or not the
application should be approved. The ordinance directed the police chief
to "make his recommendation upon his investigation of the applicant's
character and conduct as a law-abiding person" and specifically instructed him to "consider past operations, if any, [and] convictions
of felonies and crimes involving moral turpitude and connections with
criminal elements, taking into consideration the attraction by such
establishments of those of tender years." After receiving the chief's
recommendation, as well as recommendations from the building inspector and the city planner, the city manager could approve the application or disapprove it "with written notation of his reasons for
disapproval." If the city manager disapproved the application, the ap-

33. For an attempt (prior to Community Communications)to list some of the common areas that might raise antitrust problems, see Slawsky, Can Municipalities Avoid
Antitrust Liability?, 14 URB. LAW. vii (no. 1, 1982).
34. 455 U.S. 283 (1982).
35. 102 S. Ct. 1186 (1982).
36. MESQUITE, TEX., CODE ord. no. 1353, S 6, quoted in 102 S. Ct. at 1072 n.2.
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plicant could appeal the decision to the city council. When the basis
for disapproval was the police chief's adverse recommendation as to
the applicant's character, the applicant bore the burden of convincing
the council that "he or it is of good character as a law-abiding citizen."
The test of good character at this appeal was "substantially that standard employed by the Supreme Court of Texas in the licensing of
attorneys."3
Reversing the Fifth Circuit,3" the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance's direction for the police chief to consider whether a license applicant had any "connection with criminal
elements." In the Supreme Court's view, the vagueness of the phrase
"connected with criminal elements"39 did not invalidate the statute
because the phrase does not establish "the standard for approval or
disapproval of the application." The statute merely identified "a subject that the ordinance directs the Chief of Police to investigate before
he makes a recommendation to the City Manager," and "the Federal
Constitution does not preclude a city from giving vague or ambiguous
directions to officials
who are authorized to make investigations and
40
recommendations."
The Court's distinction between substantive standards and administrative directions is a pragmatic one that gives local governments
considerable flexibility while protecting individuals from arbitrary administrative decisions. Requiring a local government to avoid
vagueness in setting the standards it will use to decide whether or
not to approve applications is necessary to preclude whimsical decisions in the granting of licenses. By contrast, upholding vague directions about the matters an administrator is to consider raises far fewer
dangers of whimsical enforcement because the ultimate decision must
be justified under substantive standards to which the constitutional
requirement for precision will apply.
The regulation sustained in Village of Hoffman Estates, the other
opinion rejecting a vagueness challenge to a local business regulation,
involved the village's attempt to discourage the sale of drug
paraphenalia within its borders. The ordinance banned the sale of any
items "designed or marketed" for use with illegal drugs unless the
seller first obtained a license from the local government; in addition,

37. MESQUITE, TEX., CODE ord. no. 1353, S 9, quoted in 102 S. Ct. at 1075.
38. 630 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 1070 (1982).
39. The Court assumed "that the definition of 'connection with criminal elements'
in the city's ordinance is so vague that a defendant could not be convicted of the
offense of having such a connection" and that the "standard is also too vague to support the denial of a license to operate an amusement center." 102 S. Ct. at 1075.
40. Id. at 1075-76.
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it precluded the issuance of licenses to persons previously convicted
of drug offenses and required licensees to maintain records of all sales
of regulated items. 4 In upholding the ordinance against a contention
that it was unconstitutional on its face, the Supreme Court rejected
both overbreadth and vagueness arguments. The overbreadth claim
failed because the ordinance did not reach "a substantial amount of
constitutionally protected conduct." The vagueness claim failed because
the ordinance was not "impermissibly vague in all its applications."
Although the plaintiff in Village of Hoffman Estates claimed that
the ordinance was overbroad because it inhibited the exercise of first
amendment rights by the plaintiff and others, the Supreme Court
curtly rejected this contention for failure to show a substantial danger
of inhibiting first amendment rights. Insofar as noncommercial speech
was concerned, the village had not "directly infringed" anyone's rights;
the ordinance did "not restrict speech as such, but simply regulate[d]
the commercial marketing of items that the labels reveal may be used
for an illicit purpose."4 Insofar as commercial speech was implicated,
the plaintiff could not rely on any alleged infringement of the rights
of others "because the overbreadth doctrine does not apply to commercial speech."43 Moreover, when one confined one's inquiry to the
plaintiff's rights, the only restriction on the communication of information was to discourage "commercial activity promoting or encouraging illegal drug use," and that activity was one "which the government may regulate or ban entirely.""
The vagueness claim centered on the meaning of the phrase
"designed or marketed for use." Although the Court conceded that
this language could be ambiguous in many of its applications, it
nonetheless rejected the plaintiff's facial challenge to the statute
because the language was sufficiently precise to cover "at least some
of the items sold by [the plaintiff]. '"' The phrase "designed for use"
at least encompassed items that are "principally used with illegal drugs
by virtue of [their] objective features, i.e., features designed by the
manufacturer." As a result, the phrase was "sufficiently clear to cover
at least some of the items that [the plaintiff] sold;" as examples of
items adequately described, the Court mentioned "roach clips" and
"a specially-designed pipe that [the plaintiff] marketed."46 The Court
41. VILLAGE OF HOFFMAN ESTATES, ILL., CODE ord. no. 969 (1978), reprinted in 102
S. Ct. at 1197.
42. 102 S. Ct. at 1192.
43. Id. (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 565 n.8 (1980)).
44. 102 S. Ct. at 1192.
45. Id. at 1194.
46. Id. at 1195.
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also found the "marketed for use" phrase sufficient to cover "a
retailer's intentional display and marketing of merchandise." By incorporating this scienter requirement, the phrase satisfied the
vagueness test because it provided the plaintiff "ample warning that
its marketing activities required a license."47
The analytic virtue of Village of Hoffman Estates is its careful distinction of vagueness and overbreadth. When a statute is challenged
as impermissibly vague the underlying concerns are the need to
provide citizens with adequate warning of what conduct is criminal
and the desire to avoid the arbitrary enforcement that becomes increasingly probable when inadequate notice is provided. The vagueness
concept thus focuses on the particular individual who is challenging
the statute; if he knows that the statute forbids his conduct, the notice
requirement has been satisfied and the danger of arbitrary enforcement has been minimized. By contrast, overbreadth is a doctrine
designed to limit governmental power to discourage persons from
engaging in constitutionally protected conduct. When a statute is invalidated as overbroad, the aim is not to protect a particular individual
but to prevent the government from inhibiting the public from exercising constitutionally protected rights. As a result, the question of
whether the statute unambiguously covers a particular individual's
conduct becomes irrelevant.
Once the vagueness-overbreadth distinction is acknowledged, the
correctness of the Village of Hoffman Estates decision becomes
apparent. Because the case involved a preenforcement challenge to
the statute on its face, the vagueness doctrine required only that the
statute provide fair warning as to some conduct, and the Court's conclusion that a person of ordinary intelligence would understand that
the phrase "designed or marketed for use with cannabis or other illegal
drugs" covered some items (for example, roach clips) seems unexceptional. On the other hand, the overbreadth argument failed because
the statute did not tend to discourage any constitutionally protected
activity.4" The only "speech" it discouraged was advertising that promoted the use of illegal drugs, and the village had the constitutional
authority to discourage that activity.
The real danger raised by the village's ordinance is the possibility that it might provide inadequate notice and invite arbitrary enforcement as to situations where the ordinance's applicability is admittedly ambiguous. Courts in future litigation, however, can protect

47. Id.
48. The village conceded that its aim was "to discourage the use of the regulated
items." Id. at 1194 n.16. The plaintiffs failed to establish that their sales activities
were constitutionally protected conduct.
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adequately the individual's rights to fair notice and freedom from
arbitrary enforcement either by strictly construing the ordinance49 or
by holding it unconstitutionally vague as applied.' The mere possibility
of arbitrary enforcement in some other context should not preclude
the village from using the ordinance in a situation where its application is clear.
Both Village of Hoffman Estates and City of Mesquite display an
acceptance of, and sensitivity to, the need for local governments to
regulate businesses that operate within their borders." In light of this
acceptance and sensitivity, perhaps one should pause before embracing the most pessimistic assessments of the impact that Community
Communications will have on local regulatory authority. A Court that
is reluctant to use the general language of the first and fourteenth
amendments to limit local authority eventually may prove just as unwilling to use the general language of the antitrust laws to limit local
authority.
STATE-LOCAL RELATIONS

Although the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 expands the ability
of local governments to act in the absence of specific legislative
authorization, it still forbids local governments from exercising powers
and performing functions inconsistent with the constitution or denied
by general law. 2 The Louisiana Supreme Court considered the scope
of these limits on local power in two cases decided during the 1980-81
term.5" By defining the limitations on local governmental power fairly

49. See, e.g., People v. Lutz, 73 Ill. 2d 204, 383 N.E.2d 171 (1978) (penal statutes
are to be strictly construed in favor of the accused).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87 (1975).
51. One commentator has identified "deference to local government self-rule" as
one element of the "emerging pattern of Burger Court decisions." Gelfand, The Burger
Court and the New Federalism: Preliminary Reflections on the Roles of Local Government Actors in the Political Dramas of the 1980s, 21 B.C.L. REV. 763, 847 (1980).
52. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 4, 5, 7. For more complete descriptions of the constitution's allocation of power between state and local governments, see Murchison,
Developments in the Law, 1979-1980-Local Government Law, 41 LA. L. REV. 483, 485-86
(1981); Murchison, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courtsfor the 1977-1978 TermLocal Government Law, 39 LA. L. REV. 843, 851-53 (1979).
53. A third decision, State v. Foy, 401 So. 2d 948 (La. 1981), raised, but did not
resolve, the question of the scope of article VI, section 9(a)(1) of the Louisiana Constitution, which provides that no local government shall "define and provide for the
punishment of a felony." Following their arrest for breaking into a high school, the
Foy defendants pleaded guilty in mayor's court to charges that they had violated
TALLULAH, LA., CODE § 12-71, which made burglary a municipal offense. When the district
attorney later charged the defendants with violating LA. R.S. 14:62, which makes
burglary a felony under state law, they claimed that their convictions in the mayor's
court barred their trial on the state charges. See Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970).
The state attempted to counter this claim by arguing that the defendants were never
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narrowly, both decisions seem to advance a basic thrust of the 1974
constitution: to grant local governments a more responsible role in
the state's governmental structure.
placed in jeopardy because the mayor's court lacked jurisdiction to receive their pleas
on a burglary charge. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 595. This jurisdictional argument was,
in turn, premised on LA. CONST. art. VI, § 9(a). Since state law made burglary a felony,
the district attorney argued that section 9(a) denied local governments the power to
define and punish burglary as a local offense, and the mayor's court lacked jurisdiction to accept a guilty plea to an unconstitutional ordinance.
Although the Louisiana Supreme Court held that double jeopardy barred the retrial
of the defendants, it declined to reach the question of whether the city's ordinance
was constitutional. Relying on the state statute granting the mayor's court jurisdiction over all violations of municipal ordinances, LA. R.S. 33:441 (1950), and the presumption of validity accorded to local ordinances, 401 So. 2d at 949 (citing State v. Skinner,
358 So. 2d 280 (La. 1978); State v. Everfield, 342 So. 2d 648 (La. 1977)), the court concluded that the state lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance.
Once the proceedings in the mayor's court were complete, the court ruled, "[dlouble
jeopardy protection preventled] the State from litigating a collateral constitutional question, as a prelude for retrying them under a different statute and punishing them
a second time for the same offense." 401 So. 2d at 950.
In a concurring opinion on rehearing, Justice Dennis reached the constitutional
issues, but concluded that the prohibition in article VI, section 9(A)(1) did not prevent
a local government from punishing a crime that was a felony under state law. "[Alfter
an extensive examination of the transcripts of the constitutional convention debates,"
he was unable to "find any solid evidence that it was the intention of either the delegates
or the voters to exempt from local regulation all conduct which the state legislation
punishes as a felony." As a result, he concluded "that the constitutional intent was
merely to limit the power of municipalities to the imposition of punishment without
hard labor for a violation of a municipal regulation." 401 So. 2d at 951. Recognizing
that abuses could arise under this interpretation of section 9(a), he concluded with
a plea for the legislature to adopt a statutory solution.
Justices Marcus and Lemmon dissented. In a one-paragraph opinion, Justice Marcus simply announced his acceptance of the state's argument. Since section 9(a) prohibited the city "from enacting an ordinance defining and providing for the punishment of a felony," the mayor's court lacked "jurisdiction to accept a guilty plea to
a violation of the ordinance in question." Id. at 950. In a more extensive dissenting
opinion filed on rehearing, Justice Lemmon discussed the constitutional issue in detail
and reached the same result. He concluded that section 9(a) was designed to achieve
"two related goals." The first of these goals was the one recognized in Justice Dennis's concurring opinion: "to prohibit a municipality from providing for imprisonment
at hard labor as a punishment for conduct which is proscribed by municipal ordinance."
Id. at 952. But Justice Lemmon also claimed that section 9(a) could be reasonably interpreted to achieve a second goal as well: "to assure preemption by the state of
prosecution for criminal conduct which the Legislature has determined to be serious
enough to warrant imprisonment at hard labor." Id. The double jeopardy implications
of municipal convictions counseled, he argued, that the court should accept this
reasonable construction. To hold otherwise would allow the defendants to escape district
court prosecution for serious felonies by rushing into mayor's court, pleading guilty,
and paying fines. Permitting that result, he urged, would conflict with a corollary
logically implicit in section 9(a): "[Wlhen the Legislature determines that certain conduct should expose a person to . . . imprisonment [at hard labor], the [local] government should be precluded from deciding that such conduct should be less severely
punished." Id. (emphasis in original).
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ACORN v. City of New Orleans4 upheld the constitutionality of
a New Orleans ordinance levying a "road use charge" that applied
to automobiles registered in the parish as well as to other automobiles
owned by persons residing or businesses located in the parish.5 Article VII, section 5 of the 1974 constitution"6 expressly forbids
municipalities from "impos[ing] a license fee on motor vehicles," and
various residents challenged the New Orleans road use charge as being
inconsistent with that section of the constitution. The supreme court
rejected the challenge on the ground that the New Orleans charge
was not a "license fee" imposed on motor vehicles. Instead, the court
declared that it was "a specific tax on the ownership of motor vehicles"
to which the constitutional prohibition did not apply.
The analytic basis for the ACORN decision was the court's careful
differentiation between license fees and taxes. 7 The court defined the
power to license as a part of the police power that gives a government the power to forbid persons or businesses from engaging in certain activities without first receiving the government's formal permission. Although this power to require formal approval often includes
an incidental right to collect a consideration or fee for the privilege
being granted, the essence of the power to license remains "the power

54. 407 So. 2d 1225 (La. 1981). Justice Watson dissented, declaring that the New
Orleans levy was "clearly a license fee and violative of the Louisiana Constitution."
Id. at 1228.
55. NEW ORLEANS, LA., CODE ord. no. 7011 (1979), quoted in 407 So. 2d at 1227. Section I of the ordinance provided as follows:
The Council of the City of New Orleans hereby ordains, that a road use charge
be and is hereby levied on all motor vehicles registered in Orleans Parish, or
owned by residents of Orleans Parish, or owned by persons, firms and/or corporations whose principal place of business is located in Orleans Parish for the
year 1979 and for each year thereafter for the purpose of providing revenues
to promote and benefit the health, safety and welfare of the citizens of the City
of New Orleans including, but not limited to, the aiding of motor bus lines carrying passengers and other modes of public transit, which as a matter of public
convenience and necessity, may be required to be maintained and continued in
operation. The charge herein levied shall be according to the following
classifications:
Motorcycles and other two wheeled vehicles
annually $ 25.00
Automobiles
annually $ 50.00
Trucks, vans and pickups
annually $100.00
Section II of the ordinance required the Director of Finance to establish procedures
to collect the road use charge, and Section III limited the maximum liability of any
single taxpayer to one thousand dollars a year.
56. The complete text of section 5 provides: "The legislature shall impose an annual license tax of three dollars on automobiles for private use, and on other motor
vehicles, an annual license tax based upon horsepower, carrying capacity, weight, or
any of these. No parish or municipality may impose a license fee on motor vehicles."
57. 407 So. 2d at 1228.
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to regulate."' Thus, the licensing power (including the power to levy
license fees) is distinct from the power to raise revenues by exercising the government's authority to tax and a ban on license fees does
not bar a tax on the things or activities for which licenses cannot be
required.
Applying this distinction to the case before it, the supreme court
concluded that the New Orleans levy was "a specific tax," not "a
license fee." According to the court, "a license fee on motor vehicles
is a charge imposed for the privilege of using the streets."59 The purpose of the fee is to defray the cost of registering and licensing the
vehicles, and the government enforces the licensing requirement by
forbidding the operation of unlicensed vehicles. By contrast, the purpose of the New Orleans charge was to raise revenue for the general
needs of the city. Moreover, it applied whether or not the vehicle
was used on the city's streets and the city had made no attempt to
ban from its streets vehicles whose owners had not paid the road
use charge."0 On the basis of these characteristics, the court classified
the road use charge as "a specific tax" and held that the constitutional restriction on the power to impose license fees was inapplicable.
ACORN's immediate impact on the finances of Louisiana's local
governments is likely to be minimal for two reasons. First, the 1974
constitution requires legislative authorization before a local government can enact taxes not specifically authorized by the constitution,"
and most local governments lack a broad taxing authorization similar
to the one contained in the New Orleans charter." Second, the antitax
mood that dominates the contemporary American political scene makes
it unlikely that many local governments will initiate new taxes, even
if they are authorized to do so. 3
Despite the limited influence ACORN will have in the immediate
future, the refusal to constitutionalize current political attitudes was
nonetheless an important decision that deserves praise. The decision
58. Id.
59. Id. (citing LA. R.S. 47:536 (1950) (operation of an unregistered vehicle is a criminal
offense punishable by a maximum sentence of a $100 fine and imprisonment for 30 days)).
60. 407 So. 2d at 1228 ("the only sanction for failure to pay the road use charge
is a legal obligation enforceable by a civil action").
61. LA. CONST. art. VI, S 30.
62. See 1936 La. Acts, No. 388, S 1 (amending the New Orleans charter to confer
on the city of New Orleans "the right to levy, impose and collect any and all kinds
and classes of taxes or licenses or fees that may be imposed that are necessary for
the proper operation and maintenance of the municipality, provided same is not expressly prohibited by the Constitution of the State of Louisiana").
63. In August 1980, New Orleans repealed its road use charge "for the year 1981
and for each year thereafter." 407 So. 2d at 1228 n.6 (citing NEW ORLEANS, LA., CODE
ord. no. 7747 (1980)).
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is important because it preserves the political option for proponents
of new taxes. If they eventually can carry the day politically, they
will not lose their political victory in the courts. The decision deserves
praise because even though the license-taxation distinction on which
the court relied is narrow and technical,"' it is a distinction that has
6
long been recognized in Louisiana," as well as in other states."
Since
the distinction antedates the adoption of the 1974 constitution, it seems
reasonable to conclude that the drafters used the term "license fee"
in its technical sense and, therefore, did not intend to proscribe all
local taxes relating to motor vehicles.67
State v. Rollins Environmental Services of Louisiana, Inc.,6" the
other decision that reached the merits of a challenge to local government power, arose in the context of a criminal prosecution for keeping and burning offensive and injurious substances in violation of a
parish code. The argument raised in Rollins was a claim of preemption by state law. To phrase the issue in the language of the 1974
constitution,69 the Rollins plaintiffs claimed the state's adoption of a
comprehensive statute covering hazardous wastes denied the local
government the power to enforce its code. The trial court accepted
the preemption argument and quashed the bills of information, but
the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed and ruled that the record
established for the motion to quash did not reveal any infringement
on the state's regulatory authority over hazardous wastes.
The Rollins opinion began its analysis of the preemption issue
by reaffirming a 1979 decision76 that recognized the state's "exclusive
64. In a suit involving the same parties, the court has given an analogously narrow and technical construction to the constitution's limits on the ad valorem taxes
that local governments may impose. See ACORN v. City of New Orleans, 377 So. 2d
1206 (La. 1979). For an analysis of the first ACORN decision, see Murchison,
Developments, supra note 52, at 499.
65. See, e.g., Ewell v. Board of Supervisors, 234 La. 419, 100 So. 2d 221 (1958);
Mouledoux v. Maestri, 197 La. 525, 2 So. 2d 11 (1941).
66. See generally 0. REYNOLDS, supra note 19, at 324-25.
67. The language of section 5 authorizes the state to levy a "license tax," while
forbidding any local government from imposing a "license fee." This language can obviously be interpreted in two ways: (1) the drafters of the constitution intended to
forbid only local government exactions that are properly labeled as "fees," not those
that are appropriately described as taxes; or (2) in restricting local power, the constitution used fees in a generic sense to encompass all mandatory payments (whether
or not they would qualify as taxes). In light of this linquistic ambiguity, the court's
decision to define the words "license fees" and "taxes" as they had been defined in
prior judicial decisions seems eminently reasonable.
68. 398 So. 2d 1122 (La. 1981).
69. See LA. CONST. art. VI, S 5, 7. See generally Murchison, Developments, supra note
52, at 485-86.
70. Rollins Envtl. Serv. of La., Inc. v. Iberville Parish Police Jury, 371 So. 2d
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jurisdiction over the regulation of hazardous wastes."" Nevertheless,
the court refused to dismiss the charges in the case before it because
the record failed to demonstrate that the local ordinance infringed
on the state's regulatory authority. Although Rollins claimed that it
was being prosecuted for keeping and burning hazardous wastes, it
had offered no proof that the state had classified the substances at
Rollins' disposal site as hazardous wastes12 or that the noxious odors
stemmed from hazardous wastes. Without such evidence, the supreme
court ruled, the record contained no basis to support the trial court's
quashing of the bills of information as an infringement on an area
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the state.
The Rollins decision merits commendation. Although a fuller
record may well support the trial judge's original decision to quash
the bills, the supreme court was wise to defer its decision until it
had an adequate basis for judgment. Granting persons who handle
hazardous wastes a blanket exemption from parish regulations affecting solid wastes goes further than is necessary to preserve state control over hazardous wastes. For example, a hazardous waste facility
also may handle wastes that have not been classified as hazardous.
In such a situation, only a complete factual record will enable the
court to know whether parish regulation of the nonhazardous wastes
can be continued or whether the parish regulations would interfere
with the state's regulation of hazardous wastes. In effect, demanding
a complete record enables the court to fine tune the preemption doctrine. When enforcement of an ordinance would interfere with the
state's regulatory scheme, the court can proscribe enforcement. But
when enforcement of the ordinance would not interfere with the state
program, the local ordinance can be enforced. Such a flexible approach
is desirable because it meets the twin goals of the 1974 constitution:
giving local governments wide leeway to handle local problems and
preserving the supremacy of state law in cases of conflict.
TORT LIABILITY

The Responsible Governmental Entity
Confusion continues to shroud the question of what governmental entity will be held responsible for torts committed by deputy

1127 (La. 1979). For critiques of the earlier Rollins decision, see Murchison, Developments,
supra note 52, at 486-90; Murchison, Recent Environmental Developments Affecting Louisiana Petroleum Operations, 26 INST. ON MIN. L. 54, 76-84 (1980).
71. 398 So. 2d at 1123.
72. Id. (citing LA. R.S. 30:1133(2) (1979) (including within the definition of hazardous
wastes only those substances that the Louisiana Department of Resources "identified
and designated" as hazardous wastes)).
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sheriffs.73 Although a functional answer would impose liability on the
sheriffs office,74 that answer seemed foreclosed when Louisiana's courts
faced the issue in the second half of the 1970s and recognized the
long-standing American traditions declaring that the sheriff held a
personal office and that the office was not a governmental entity."5
Faced with this conceptual barrier to imposing liability on the sheriffs
office and unwilling to impose personal liability on the sheriff, the
Louisiana Supreme Court eventually ruled that the state, not the
sheriffs office or the parish governing authority, was the governmental
entity that should be treated as the deputy sheriffs "employer" in
tort actions based on the alleged negligence of the deputy.76
The Louisiana Supreme Court's new rule rendered the state liable
for all negligent acts committed by deputy sheriffs, even though the
state had no effective means for controlling the conduct of the
deputies. The legislature, however, acted quickly to change the judicial
rule. A 1978 act77 deleted the statutory provision limiting the sheriffs
liability for the acts of his deputies to the amount of the bond furnished by the deputy" and added a new section to the Revised
Statutes declaring that the state was not liable for the acts of deputy
sheriffs."9 Unfortunately, the 1978 legislation contained no express overruling of the alternate basis for the supreme court's holding that the
sheriff was not liable for the torts of his deputies-the nonstatutory
rule that the sheriff was liable only for the "official acts" of his

73. The question of which governmental entity is responsible for the torts of a
local official has arisen most frequently with respect to deputy sheriffs, but the issue
also can arise in cases involving other state officers who serve within the boundaries
of a single local government. E.g., Hryhorchuk v. Smith, 390 So. 2d 497 (La. 1980)
(constable); Mullins v. State, 387 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1980) (coroner); Cosenza v. Aetna
Ins. Co., 341 So. 2d 1304 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977) (clerk of city court); Honeycutt v.
Town of Boyce, 341 So. 2d 327 (La. 1976) (town marshal). See also Murchison, Work
of the Louisiana Appellate Courts, supra note 52, at 877 n.162.
74. See Foster v. Hampton, 352 So. 2d 197 (La. 1977).
75. See LA. CONST. art. V, S27; Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Grant Parish Sheriff's Dep't,
350 So. 2d 236, 238-39 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977); 1 W. ANDERSON, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF SHERIFFS, CORONERS. AND CONSTABLES WITH FORMS, SS 6, 20, 42-44 (1941); W.
HARLOW, DUTIES OF SHERIFFS AND CONSTABLES, S 1-3 (3d rev. ed. 1907).
76. In Foster v. Hampton, 352 So. 2d 197 (La. 1977), the court held that neither
the sheriff nor the parish was liable for the torts of a deputy sheriff and suggested
in dicta that the state would be liable. Two years later, the court converted the dicta
on state liability into an express holding. Foster v. Hampton, 381 So. 2d 789 (La. 1980).
For analyses of the two Foster decisions, see Murchison, Developments, supra note 52,
at 518-19, 522-23; Murchison, Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts, supra note 52,
at 871-79.
77. 1978 La. Acts, No. 318.
78. Id., S 1, amending LA. R.S. 33:1433 (Supp. 1972).
79. 1978 La. Acts, No. 318, S 2, adding LA. R.S. 42:1441.
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deputy8 -and its attempt to eliminate state liability was arguably inconsistent with the constitutional provision abrogating governmental
immunity."1
During the 1981-82 term, the appellate courts of the state struggled
to determine the impact of the 1978 act on the prior judicial ruling which made the state responsible for a deputy's torts. The general
thrust of these opinions has been to bend legal doctrine to accommodate it to functional reality; that is, to find ways to hold the sheriffs
office rather than the state liable for the actions of the sheriffs
deputies.
The accommodation of legal doctrine to functional reality began
with the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Jenkins v. Jefferson
Parish Sheriffs Office,8" a 1981 decision involving an accident that
occurred after the effective date of the 1978 statute discussed above.
After noting the "questionable constitutionality" of the statutory
attempt to eliminate state liability,' a divided court held that the 1978
statute was at least partially effective. The statute rendered the sheriff

80. See Foster v. Hampton, 352 So. 2d 197, 200-01 (1977) (approving prior decisions that held that the negligent operation of a motor vehicle is not an official act
of a deputy).
81. LA. CONST. art. XII, S 10; see Murchison, Work of the LouisianaAppellate Courts,
supra note 52, at 878.
82. 402 So. 2d 669 (La. 1981). Justice Blanche filed an opinion concurring in part
and dissenting in part, while Justices Marcus and Watson both filed dissenting opinions.
Justice Blanche agreed with the majority that "Act No. 318 ... sought to legislatively
overrule" the judicial decisions recognizing the state as a deputy sheriffs employer,
that "[this legislation left the way open for the imposition of respondeat superior liability
on a sheriff for the delictual acts of his deputy," and that the plaintiffs allegations
were sufficient to state a cause of action against the defendant sheriff. Nonetheless,
he regarded a holding "that this sheriff was the employer of this deputy" premature,
because the record contained no "evidence" to "prove an employment relationship,"
and he also wished to "pretermit a decision determining the source of funds" for satisfying any judgment until the issue was properly presented. 402 So. 2d at 673.
The dissenting justices objected to the majority's conclusion that the sheriff was
liable for the torts of his deputies in his official capacity as sheriff. Justice Marcus's
one-paragraph opinion argued for continued adherence to the "official act" doctrine
that makes the sheriff "only responsible for acts and omissions of deputies when they
are acting in performance of their official duties." Id. at 673 (citing Gray v. DeBretton,
192 La. 628, 188 So. 722 (1939)). Justice Watson's longer opinion focused more specifically
on the 1978 Act and rejected the majority's conclusion that it imposed liability on
the sheriff. In his view, the law simply removed certain limitations on the sheriffs
liability; nothing in the Act's title or body made "sheriffs . . . employers of their
deputies" or rendered them responsible for a deputy's torts. 402 So. 2d at 657 & n.9
(citing- Murchison, Work of the Louisiana Appellate Court, supra note 52, at 877-78).
As a result, he argued, the prior judicial rule that the sheriff was not the employer
of his deputies applied.
83. 402 So. 2d at 670.
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liable for the torts of his deputies,
but only "in his official capacity
4
as employer of [the deputies].
According to the majority opinion, two factors convinced the court
to impose liability on the sheriff. First, the court reassessed the
realities of the actual employment situation of deputies in light of
modern tort law. On the basis of that reassessment, the court concluded that, notwithstanding prior decisions to the contrary, "[t]he
reality of the situation is that there does exist an employment relationship between a sheriff and his deputies."85 Second, the court relied
on the 1978 Act, which "clearly indicated [the legislature's] intention
that governmental, responsibility for torts committed by a public
employee should be placed on the public officer most closely related
to the tortfeasor. '8 Since "neither the state nor the parish (the other
logical entities on which liability might be imposed) exercises any
significant control over sheriff's deputies," the Jenkins majority concluded that the sheriff was "the appropriate governmental entity on
which to place responsibility for the torts of a deputy sheriff." 7
The court hastened to preclude the possibility of a sheriff being
held personally liable for the torts of his deputies.8 Emphasizing that
"the sheriff acts solely in his official capacity" in the employment relationship with his deputies,89 the Jenkins court held that the sheriff's
vicarious liability arising from that relationship also must be limited
to his official capacity. "[H]e is liable only because he is sheriff and
is only liable to the extent that he holds that office. He is not liable
personally, and his personal funds and property cannot be subjected
to execution of a judgment decreeing that liability."9 Explicitly
84. Id. at 669.
85. Id. at 671. The court's summary of the employment relationship is quoted below:
The sheriff, and not the state, hires and fires deputies, exercises direct and indirect supervision and control over them, fixes their time and place of work, and
generally allocates their responsibility and assigns their duties. Although the money
for the operation of the various sheriffs' departments may come from various
sources of public funds (primarily fees as tax collector and in civil and criminal
matters), the sheriffs disburse the allocated funds and actually pay most of the
salaries of the deputies with these funds. No one but the sheriff can realistically
be viewed as the employer of the deputies.
Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Traditionally, a sheriff's liability always has been regarded as personal. See
Murchison, Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts, supra note 52, at 871-72.
89. 402 So. 2d at 671.
90. Id. (footnote omitted). In the deleted footnote, the court emphasized that Jenkins
did "not involve the sheriff's liability for his own negligence, as might occur, for example, when the sheriff sends a deputy out on patrol in a motor vehicle when the
sheriff actually knew that the deputy was intoxicated." Id. at 671 n.3. In such a case,
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recognizing that this approach presented practical problems of
enforcement,91 the Jenkins opinion concluded with a plea for "[a]n
overall legislative plan of action ... to resolve the problem of which
governmental entity is responsible in this type case so that the appropriate entity may set aside funds to cover that responsibility with
liability insurance. '"92
The conceptual basis of Jenkins is its sub silentio redefinition of
the "sheriff' as a "governmental entity,"93 rather than the holder of
a public office whose benefits and burdens are personal in nature. 4
In functional terms (if not in legal theory),95 Jenkins overrules prior
precedents holding that the "office of the sheriff" is not an entity
capable of being sued," for no practical distinction exists between suing
the "office" and suing the "sheriff" but limiting enforcement of any
judgments to the public funds that the sheriff controls in his public
capacity.
The various decisions in the courts of appeal97 were consistent
with the Jenkins approach in that they sought to impose liability upon
the sheriffs office rather than the state. For example, the first circuit held that since the state's liability as employer was derivative,
the state was entitled to indemnification from the deputy and from
any insurer whose policy covered his actions. Now that Jenkins has
concluded that "the realities of the employment situation" require
recognition of the sheriff as the deputy's employer, the state may
be able to get indemnity from the sheriff as well."
The third circuit has gone even further than the supreme court
the sheriff would remain personally liable. For a case containing such allegations of
personal negligence, see Nolen v. State, 377 So. 2d 586 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979), criticized
in Murchison, Developments, supra note 52, at 519-20, 523-24.
91. 402 So. 2d at 671-72.
92. Id. at 672 & n.6 (citing Murchison, Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts,
supra note 52, at 878).
93. 402 So. 2d at 671.
94. See note 75, supra.
95. The court did not consider whether the "Jefferson Parish Sheriffs Office"
was a proper defendant because the plaintiff did not challenge the dismissal of his
suit against that office. 402 So. 2d at 669 n.1.
96. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Grant Parish Sheriffs Dep't, 350 So. 2d 236, 238-39
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
97. In addition to the cases discussed in the text, the first circuit held that the
state was a deputy's employer under the worker's compensation law, Phillips v. State,
400 So. 2d 1091 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981), and the fourth circuit ruled that the city
of New Orleans was not liable for an injury caused by an Orleans Parish deputy sheriff,
Johnson v. Doe, 410 So. 2d 365 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982).
98. Phillips v. State, 400 So. 2d 1091 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981). Presumably, any indemnity judgment against the sheriff would make him liable only in his official capacity.
99. 402 So. 2d at 671.
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in two opinions upholding the constitutionality of the 1978 statute's
elimination of state liability for the torts of deputy sheriffs. Martinez
v. Reynolds,'° which was issued before the supreme court's decision
in Jenkins, is the more comprehensive of the two opinions. Martinez
upheld the statute as an exercise of the "valid legislative function"
of regulating "causes of action, including replacement and even abolition of causes of action that one person may have against another
for personal injuries.".1 Since the 1978 statute also removed "the
former limitations on the liability of sheriffs," the legislature had provided "an adequate remedy" and merely was compelling persons injured by deputies "to seek ...relief from the parties who were in
the best position to prevent such injuries."'0 2 After the supreme court
decision in Jenkins, the third circuit reaffirmed its Martinez holding
as consistent with the intervening supreme court opinion. The new
opinion in Sullivan v. Quick,"3 however, did not reanalyze the issue
in any detail; it simply relied on the authority of its own precedent
and that of the supreme court.
Since the third circuit's decisions in Martinez and Sullivan conflict with an earlier decision of the fourth circuit on the constitutional
issue,0 4 the question remains unsettled. But, even though the supreme
court's Jenkins opinion noted "the questionable constitutionality" of
the attempt to eliminate state liability," 5 that opinion's rationale for
imposing liability on the sheriff in his official capacity may also provide the basis for upholding the statute as constitutional. To the extent that the supreme court adheres to its declaration in Jenkins that
the sheriff "is a governmental entity,"'0 6 the legislative provision does
not seem to conflict with the constitutional provision abolishing governmental immunity. If the sheriff is a governmental entity, the state
will not have eliminated the plaintiff's cause of action against the
government but merely will have changed which governmental entity
is liable for those damages." 7 On the other hand, if the Louisiana
Supreme Court retreats from the Jenkins language to the traditional
position that the sheriff's office is personal in nature, the 1978 statute
100. 398 So. 2d 156 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
101. Id. at 160.
102. Id.
103. 406 So. 2d 284 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
104. Carmouche v. Oubre, 394 So. 2d 805 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981).
105. 402 So. 2d at 670. The third circuit's opinion in Sullivan made no reference to this
language in Jenkins.
106. 402 So. 2d at 671.
107. In light of the Louisiana Supreme Court's reluctance to provide an effective means
of enforcing judgments against governmental defendants, see notes 133-45 infra, and accompanying text, one might argue that the substitution of the sheriff for the state was
impermissible because it reduced the likelihood that the plaintiff would be able to collect
a large judgment.
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is probably unconstitutional because it eliminates all governmental
108
liability for torts committed by a deputy.
The "questionable constitutionality"' 9 of the 1978 statute serves
to reiterate what has been apparent since the supreme court's initial
decision making the state liable for the torts of deputies: what is really
needed is a comprehensive legislative enactment to settle the liability issue.' 0 Without such a legislative solution, the courts may modify
existing doctrines to eliminate the most illogical of the current liability provisions. However, they are unlikely to devise a system that imposes liability on the proper governmental body and also guarantees
injured persons a cause of action against a solvent defendant."'
Legislative action almost certainly is required to achieve both of these
goals." 2
Liability Under Article 2317
Article 2317 of the Civil Code" 3 renders a defendant liable for
damages caused by things under his control. To establish a cause of
action under 2317, a plaintiff must prove the following: the defendant
had custody of the thing causing the injury, the thing was defective,
and the defect caused the plaintiffs injury. Once these elements are
established, the defendant can escape liability only if he can
demonstrate affirmatively that the victim's fault, the fault of a third
person, or an irresistible force should be regarded as the legal cause
of the plaintiffs injury.'
In 1980, the Louisiana Supreme Court refused to create a governmental exception to article 2317.1" The predictable response has been
a spate of decisions as the courts of appeal try to define the extent
108. See Murchison, Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts, supra note 52, at 878.
109. 402 So. 2d at 670.
110. Accord id. at 672 & n.6 (citing Murchison, Work of the LouisianaAppellate Courts,
supra note 52, at 878).
111. Thus far, Louisiana's appellate courts have failed to develop an adequate method
for enforcing judgments against governmental defendants. See notes 133-45 infra, and accompanying text.
112. For a suggestion as to one method for structuring a legislative solution, see Mur-

chison, Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts, supra note 52, at 878-79.
113. Article 2317 provides in pertinent part: "We are responsible, not only for the damage
occasioned by our own act, but for that which is caused by the act of persons for whom
we are answerable, or of things which we have in our custody."
114. Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975); see also Rodrique v. Dixilyn Corp., 620
F.2d 537 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981). For an excellent article criticizing
the recent decisions interpreting article 2317, see Malone, Ruminations on Liability for
the Acts of Things, 42 LA. L. REV. 979 (1982).
115. Jones v. City of Baton Rouge, 388 So. 2d 737, 740 (La. 1980); see also Shipp v. City
of Alexandria, 395 So. 2d 727, 729 (La. 1981). The Jones and Shipp cases are discussed in
Murchison, supra note 19, at 588-92.
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of this new liability. The opinions of the past year collectively have
tended to limit local government liability under article 231716 by emphasizing the requirement that the governmental entity have custody
of the thing causing harm, by defining as defective only things that
produce an unreasonable risk of harm, and by holding actions of the
plaintiff or third parties sufficient to supplant the defective thing as
the legal cause of the plaintiffs injury.
McNeal v. Division of State Police"7 involved a traffic accident
resulting from brake failure in a truck. Prior to the accident, the driver
had reported the defective brakes to a city police officer, but the officer allowed the truck to be driven to state police headquarters. The
plaintiffs argued that this action rendered the city liable under arti'
cle 2317. 18
The first circuit, however, rejected this argument on the
ground that custody was a prerequisite to liability under article 2317.
Since the city did not have custody over the truck when the accident
occurred, the first element of an article 2317 claim was lacking, and
the court declared itself unwilling to expand the article to reach"cases
in which a thing is not in one's custody, when the court feels it should
be in one's custody."'1 9
The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that a thing is defective
within the meaning of article 2317 only if it presents an unreasonable
risk of harm and that the unreasonableness issue is resolved by balancing the probability and magnitude of the risk against the utility of
the thing.'20 During the 1981-82 term, the courts of appeal applied this

116. In addition to the cases discussed in the text, see Garrison v. State, 401 So. 2d
528 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981).(city's maintenance agreement with the state did not render
it responsible for damages caused by a malfunctioning traffic light).
117. 412 So. 2d 1123 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 414 So. 2d 1252 (La. 1982).
118. The plaintiff also argued that the city was liable for the officer's negligence in
permitting the truck to remain on the highway. The court, however, ruled that any negligence
on the part of the police officer was "too remote from the accident ... to constitute an
actionable cause of the accident" and offered the following factual summary to support
this conclusion.
After [the driver of the truck] left [the police officer], Gates drove the truck down
the Airline Highway to a point opposite Troop A headquarters; he was permitted by
the State Police to make a U-turn on Airline Highway to enter the Troop A parking
lot; the brakes were inspected and found to be faulty; the State Police made no physical
restraint upon the use of the vehicle, and Gates entered Airline Highway and proceeded down the same until the accident occurred. These acts and omissions replace
any negligence of the City Police as the cause of the accident.
Id. at 1126.
119. Id. at 1128. c: Hall v. City of New Orleans, 400 So. 2d 265 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981)
(city.properly dismissed where evidence revealed that thing causing the injury was in the
custody of the Sewerage and Water Board).
120. See Kent v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 418 So. 2d 493 (La. 1982); Hunt v. City Stores,
Inc., 387 So. 2d 585, 588 (La. 1980).
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unreasonableness standard in a variety of circumstances, and the
results they reached seem fairly consistent. When the thing causing
the injury was poorly designed 2' or maintained,'22 the courts of appeal
held the local government liable. On the other hand, when the injury
occurred as the result of contact with a prudently designed and maintained public improvement, the courts of appeal ruled that any risk
of harm was reasonable, precluding liability under article 2317.123 As
a practical matter, the cases seem to be using the defect issue to
reestablish a negligence-type standard that will hold local governments
liable under article 2317 only when they have failed to take all
reasonable steps to minimize the dangers associated with carrying
out their essential responsibilities.'24
The fourth circuit proved willing in the past year to limit the
reach of article 2317 further by treating the plaintiff's negligence or
the actions of third persons as precluding liability under article 2317.
In three decisions, the court held that the fault of the victim"' or
a third party 26 was sufficient to break the chain of causation between
the defective thing and the plaintiff's injury. In essence, these opinions turned on the question of proximate cause. Although the defective thing remained a "but for" cause of the plaintiffs injury, the court
judged the plaintiff's own negligence as sufficiently independent of
the defect to justify regarding it as the sole legal cause of the accident.
A slightly different defense was urged successfully in Swatn v.
Sewerage & Water Board,2 7 where the plaintiff was injured when she

121. Bacile v. Parish of Jefferson, 411 So. 2d 1088 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981), writ denied,
415 So. 2d 950 (La. 1982) (drainage grate into which a normal-sized, eleven-year-old child
could fall up to her knees); cf. McCoy v. Franklin Parish Police Jury, 414 So. 2d 1369 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1982) (no sign at intersection).
122. Hall v. City of New Orleans, 400 So. 2d 265 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981) (cracked drain
cover for sewer catch basin).
123. Alexander v. Rapides Parish Police Jury, 415 So. 2d 607 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982);
McLeod v. Parish of East Baton Rouge, 414 So. 2d 1341, 1345 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982);
Greenhouse v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 413 So. 2d 352 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982); Goodlow
v. City of Alexandria, 407 So. 2d 1305, 1308-09 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
124. The plaintiff does gain one procedural advantage of considerable significance under
article 2317. He does not have to prove that the defendant knew or should have ,known
of the defect. See Kent v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 418 So. 2d 493 (La. 1982); Jones v. City
of Baton Rouge, 388 So. 2d 737, 739-40 (La. 1980).
125. Carpenter v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 411 So. 2d 1206 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
denied, 415 So. 2d 951 (La. 1982); Orazio v. Durel, 407 So. 2d 75 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981).
126. Tappel v. Vidros, 407 So. 2d 789 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981). But see Robertson v. Parish
of East Baton Rouge, 415 So. 2d 365 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982) (negligence of third party whose
actions were conducted with the permission of the custodian did not preclude liability under
article 2317).
127. 413 So. 2d 233 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982).
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fell into an uncovered water meter box. Although the defendant had
custody of the meter box and the missing cover made it a defective
thing, the board escaped liability under article 2317 because the defect
was the fault of third parties (i.e., children in the area who had removed the cover). Here the issue was one of responsibility rather than
causation. The defective thing remained the cause of the accident, but
the court held that the custodian should not have been held responsible for damages from a defect that was created by third persons.
The decisions of the past year reflect an increasing tendency of
the Louisiana courts to blur the distinction between the traditional
negligence theory and the "strict" liability imposed by article 2317.128
But despite this tendency, one still can identify several differences
between the two theories that may prove significant in lawsuits
against local governments. First, article 2317 applies only when the
local government has custody over the thing causing injury, while the
negligence theory imposes no such prerequisite. Second, article 2317
eliminates the need for the traditional requirement'" that the plaintiff prove either that the defendant knew of the defect or that he
could have known of the defect if he had exercised reasonable care.
Third, several decisions have recognized the "fault" of the victim or
a third party as a complete bar to liability under 2317, 30' even though
the Louisiana Civil Code's comparative negligence article... now applies to negligence claims. Fourth, a defendant still may be held liable
under a negligence theory, even though a third party was responsible for the defective thing that caused the plaintiff's injury, if the
local government negligently failed to discover and to correct the
defect.132 Because of these distinctions, proper analysis of tort cases
against local governments still requires careful attention to the
theoretical basis of the plaintiff's claim.

128. See generally Kent v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 418 So. 2d 493 (La. 1982).
129. See, e.g., Jones v. City of Baton Rouge, 388 So. 2d 737, 739-40 (La. 1980); Pickens
v. St. Tammany Parish Police Jury, 323 So. 2d 430 (La. 1975). A recent decision of the supreme
court in a lawsuit that did not involve a governmental defendant has emphasized this distinction as the most important difference between article 2317 and liability based on the defendant's negligence. Kent v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 418 So. 2d 493 (La. 1982).
130. Carpenter v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 411 So. 2d 1206 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
denied, 415 So. 2d 951 (La. 1982); Tappel v. Vidros, 407 So. 2d 789 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981);
Orazio v. Durel, 407 So. 2d 75 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981). But see Dorry v. LaFleur, 399 So.
2d 559 (La. 1981) (whether contributory negligence of the victim will preclude liability under
article 2317 must be decided on a case-by-case basis).
131. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2323. The supreme court has not yet addressed the issue of
whether the comparative negligence statute can be applied in a 2317 action. See generally
Plant, Comparative Negligence and Strict Tort Liability, 40 LA. L. REV. 403 (1980).
132. See Swain v. Sewerage & Water Bd., 413 So. 2d 233 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982).
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Enforcement of Judgments
One factor that diminishes the impact of the recent decisions expanding the tort liability of local governments is the lack of a method
to force a governmental defendant to pay judgments that are rendered
against it. The 1974 constitution immunizes public property and public
funds from seizures and provides that judgments against local governments shall not be paid "except from funds appropriated ...by the

• ..political subdivision against which the judgment is rendered."'33
In Foreman v. Vermilion ParishPolice Jury,'"' the third circuit held
that these provisions precluded execution of a tort judgment against
any property owned by the parish, and the supreme court denied
writs. As a practical matter, Foreman seemed to leave the successful
tort*plaintiff at the mercy of the governmental entity that was his
adversary.
The Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Fontenot v. State
Department of Highways,3 ' rendered in the year following the Foreman
decision, hinted that the court might devise some method for enforcing judgments against local governments, perhaps by writ of
mandamus.'36 The precise issue in Fontenot was whether a successful
tort plaintiff could force a police jury to submit to a judgment debtor
examination, and the supreme court ruled that the police jury had
to submit. Although the court disclaimed any intent to decide whether
the plaintiff had any right to execute his judgment,3 ' one hardly would

133.

LA. CONST. art. XII, S 10(c):
The legislature shall provide a procedure for suits against the state, a state agency,
or a political subdivision. It shall provide for the effect of a judgment, but no public
property or public funds shall be subject to seizure. No judgment against the state,
a state agency, or a political subdivision shall be exigible, payable, or paid except from
funds appropriated therefor by the legislature or by the political subdivision against
which judgment is rendered.
134. 336 So. 2d 986 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 339 So. 2d 846 (La. 1976). For analyses
of the Foremanopinion, see Murchison, supra note 16, at 475-76 and Note, Enforcement
of JudgmentsAgainst GovernmentalEntities: The New Sovereign Immunity, 37 LA. L. REV.
982 (1977).
135. 355 So. 2d 1324 (La. 1978). For an analysis of the Fontenot opinion, see Murchison,
Work of the LouisianaAppellate Courts, supra note 52, at 869-71.
136. The first circuit opinion refusing to order the judgment debtor examination had
rejected the argument that mandamus was available. See Fontenot v. State Dep't of
Highways, 358 So. 2d 981, 982 (La. App. 1st Cir.), rev'd, 355 So. 2d 1324 (La. 1978). The
precedents on the mandamus issue may be somewhat more equivocal than the first circuit's Fontenot opinion suggests. See Murchison, Work of the LouisianaAppellate Courts,
supra note 52, at 870 n.126; cf. Penalber v. Blount, 407 So. 2d 1189 (La. 1981) (Lemmon,
J.,.concurring in denial of writ) ("The hackneyed expression that mandamus doesn't lie
to compel performance of a ministerial duty does not address the visceral problem.").
137. 355 So. 2d 1325 ("[Tlhis order is not intended to affect proceedings beyond the
judgment debtor examination.").
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have expected the court to order the examination if its results could
not benefit the plaintiff.
During the 1981-82 term, decisions of both the first and fourth
circuits rejected creditors' attempts to enforce their judgments against
local governments. In Penalber v. Blount,138 the police jury voted to
pay the plaintiff's judgment but then rescinded its resolution twelve
days later. 139 The first circuit affirmed the trial court's denial of a
writ of mandamus in a single sentence asserting that "appropriation
of funds by a public body is a discretionary, not ministerial duty, and
cannot be compelled by a writ of mandamus."' 14° The fourth circuit's
opinion in De Laureal Engineers, Inc. v. St. Charles Parish Police
Jury4' contained a somewhat longer analysis but reached the same
result. "[A]ppropriation of funds is discretionary and not ministerial,
and mandamus will not lie to compel payment of a judgment by a
police jury." 142
The Louisiana Supreme Court's denial of writs in Penalber and
De Laureal suggests that the legislative arena will now be the focus
of attempts to provide an effective means for enforcing judgments
against governmental defendants. Although individual judges have
suggested 4 1 that the fourteenth amendment's guarantees of equal protection and due process 44 might provide a means for compelling
payments, the likelihood of obtaining such relief seems minimal. Unless
a local government discriminates on racial or similar grounds, the
federal courts will give the governmental decision only limited scrutiny
to determine if it bears a rational relationship to a permissible governmental objective.' 5 Since the decision not to pay always will be related
138. 405 So. 2d 1378 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 407 So. 2d 1189 (La. 1981).
139. The court of appeal also rejected the factual claim that the police jury had entered
into a valid settlement agreement with the plaintiff. 405 So. 2d at 1379. The court,
however, did not offer any explanation as to how a settlement agreement would confer any greater rights than a tort judgment.
140. Id. (citing Fontenot v. Department of Highways, 358 So. 2d 981 (La. App. 1st Cir:
1978)). The court failed to note that the Louisiana Supreme Court had overruled the Fontenot
decision on other grounds. See 355 So. 2d at 1324. The reason for this omission may be the
faulty references in the reports of the Fontenot decision. See Murchison, Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts, supra note 52, at 870 n.123.
141. 406 So. 2d 770 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981), writ denied, 410 So. 2d 758 (La. 1982).
142. 406 So. 2d at 772.
143. De Laureal Eng'rs, Inc. v. St. Charles Parish Police Jury, 410 So. 2d 758, 759 (La.
1982) (Dennis, J., concurring in denial of writ); Foreman v. Vermilion Parish Police Jury,
336 So. 2d 986, 989-90 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 339 So. 2d 846 (La. 1976) (Miller, J.,

concurring); see Hargrave, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1977-1978
Term-LouisianaConstitutionalLaw, 39 LA. L. REV. 807,819 (1979).
144. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, 5 1; see also LA. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3.
145. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). One form of discrimination - paying
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to the valid objective of conserving governmental resources, the
chances of obtaining judicial relief on an equal protection or due due
process claim are slim.
Ironically, the failure of the courts to develop an effective means
for enforcing judgments may provide the catalyst for passage of a
comprehensive tort claims act applicable to local governments. If recent decisions expanding liability have worked as great a financial
hardship on local governments as local officials claim, one can anticipate that at least some local governments will refuse, or fail, to
pay judgments rendered against them. To the extent that this practice becomes commonplace, the plaintiff's bar and its political allies
may compromise with local governments on a tort statute that modifies
some liability rules but also provides a viable method of collection.
Until that time, however, tort plaintiffs who prevail in their lawsuits
apparently will remain dependent on the good faith of their government debtors.
the claims of residents of the local government area but refusing to pay the claims of
nonresidents-might be invalidated under the equal protection clause as an impermissible restriction on the constitutionally protected right to travel.

